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RACIAL PREFERENCE IN LAW SCHOOL ADMISSIONS:
THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN A DIVERSE LEGAL
PROFESSION
ROBERT

A. SEDLER*

In this paper I will relate racial preference in law school admissions
to the public interest in a diverse legal profession. I will justify racial
preference in law school admissions on the ground that it has been
necessary to, and has succeeded in, bringing about a diverse legal
profession in the United States. This fact is beyond dispute. I will then
explain why I think that, even if law schools are not permitted to use
racialpreference in admissions, the number of minority law students
in the aggregate will not decline significantly, and that we will continue
to have a diverse legal profession. The worst that can happen - if it is
a "worst" - is that there may be a decline in the number of minority law
students coming from the "elite" law schools.
Racial preference in law school admissions means that law schools
affirmatively take race into account in the admissions process, where
the question is which of the qualifiedapplicants will be admitted. Law
school admission has long been, and continues to be, determined
primarily by a consideration of comparative LSAT scores and grades.
All admitted applicants at any law school have sufficiently good LSAT
scores and grades that they are likely to successfully complete the
course of study at that law school. Taking race into account does result
in a substantial number of minority applicants being admitted with
lower grades and LSAT scores than many of the white applicants who
are admitted and at least some of the white applicants who are not
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admitted. I However, all of the minority students who are admitted are
fully qualified for admission at that law school, and at Wayne State and
many other law schools, virtually all of them graduate, as do virtually
all of the white students. Furthermore, most minority students pass the
bar examination on their first try, as do most white students.
When racially preferential law school admissions policies were first
adopted in the middle 1960s, the primary purpose for doing so was not
to attain a racially diverse student body in law schools, although the
programs had this clearly desirable educational effect.2 Rather, the
primary purpose was to increase the representation of racial minorities
in the legal profession where they were seriously under-represented. At
the time of Regents v. Bakke3 in 1978, for example, no more than two
percent of the lawyers in this country were African American and the
representation of Hispanic Americans and Native Americans was even
lower
In order to achieve the objective of improved minority

1. The differences in comparative LSAT scores for minority applicants and
white applicants at the University of Texas Law School is summarized in
Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,518 U.S. 1033
(1996). In the 1992 year, the mean GPA/LSAT for resident white applicants was
3.56/164; for black applicants, it was 3.30/158; for Mexican-American applicants,
it was 3.24/157; and for "other minority" applicants it was 3.58/160.
2. Since my focus is on the public interest in a diverse legal profession, I do not
address the educational interest of law schools in achieving a diverse legal body. See,
e.g., the discussion of this interest in Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 316-19 (1978). See also, Howard Lesnick, What Does
Bakke Require of Law Schools? 128 U. PA. L. REv. 141 (1979).
3. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
4. The data showing under-representation of minority lawyers at that time is
discussed in Robert A. Sedler, Racial Preference,Reality and the Constitution:
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representation in the legal profession, it was absolutely necessary for
law schools to adopt racially preferential admissions policies.
For reasons directly traceable to the consequences of the long and
tragic history of racial discrimination in the United States, there was,
and continues to be, an enormous economic gap between African
Americans as a group and whites as a group, which in turn leads to an
enormous racial educational gap. The same racial educational gap
exists for other racial-ethnic minorities such as Hispanic Americans and
Native Americans.' This unpleasant and undisputed fact, coupled with
the fact that in the aggregate there will be many more white applicants
than minority applicants at a particular law school, means that if race
were not affirmatively taken into account in the admission process that is, if admission were determined solely by comparative LSAT
scores and grades - relatively few minority students would have been
admitted at most law schools.
The same is true today as regards the applicant pool at any particular
law school: because of the racial educational gap and the substantially
larger number of white applicants, if race were not affirmatively taken
into account in the admissions process, relatively few minority students
would be admitted at that law school. This is the stark reality of the
situation.
There can be no doubt that racial preference for minority applicants
produces unfairness to the non-admitted white applicants who have
Bakke v. Regents of the University of California,17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329,

346-47, ns. 65-71 (1977) [hereinafter Sedler, Bakke].
5. See the discussion and review of the data in Sedler, Bakke, supra note 4, at
350-353, ns. 80-88; Robert A. Sedler, The Constitution,Racial Preference,and the
Equal Participation Objective, in SLAVERY AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: THE
CONSTITUTION, EQUALITY AND RACE 123, 139, n. 17 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art
Kaufman eds. 1988) [hereinafter Sedler, Racial Preference].
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higher grades and LSAT scores than a number of the admitted minority
applicants. The racial preference is racial discrimination,6 and the
discrimination seems particularly unfair when the minority students
who receive the preference come from the same advantaged
backgrounds as the non-admitted white students and still more unfair
when the preference works against less advantaged white students. The
proponents of racial preference in law school admissions must
acknowledge the unfair results that racial preference produces for
individual white applicants.
I submit, however, that while racial preference in law school
admissions may be unfair to individual white applicants, it is not
unjustifiable. It is not unjustifiable, because it serves the public
interest. Moreover, there is a very strong public interest in a racially
diverse legal profession and in the full participation of racial minorities
in this very important aspect of American life. Minority lawyers bring
to the profession the perspective that comes from the experience of
being a minority person in America, and the equal participation of
minorities in the legal profession makes the legal profession truly
representative of all Americans. Because of racial preference in law
school admissions, the representation of racial minorities in the legal
profession has substantially increased, both in terms of percentage and
in terms of actual numbers, and the legal profession today is very
different from what it was a generation ago. Minority lawyers serve as
judges, prosecutors and law professors. They are lawyers for the
government, "members of the firm," and bar association officers. They
are in a position to contribute directly to the American legal system, to

6. A discussion of the constitutional issues in regard to racially preferential law
school admissions is beyond the scope of this paper. On this subject, see Robert A.
Sedler, The Constitutionand Racial Preference in Law School Admissions, 75 MICH.
B.J. 1160 (Nov. 1996).
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make that system responsive to the needs of minority persons, and to
build the confidence of minority persons in the legal system and the
administration of justice precisely because minority lawyers are an
integral part of that system. I submit, therefore, that racially preference
in law school admissions advances a strong public interest, and
therefore, is justifiable.7
I do not believe that most of the opponents of racial preference in
law school admissions are opposed to the equal participation of racial
minorities in the legal profession. Rather their insistence seems to be
that today at least, racial preference in law school admissions is not
necessary to achieve a diverse legal profession. They maintain that
with a completely race-neutral admissions policy at all law schools,
minority students still will be admitted to law school in substantial
numbers and will continue to become lawyers.
As a strong proponent of a racially diverse legal profession, who
also tries to be an objective observer, I believe that they are correct in
their insistence. While the educational gap between racial minorities
as a group and whites as a group continues to exist, the last twenty
years or so have seen a substantial increase in the numbers of minority
students graduating from college and in the numbers of minority
students with good grades and good LSAT scores.
It has been contended by the opponents of racial preference in law
school admissions that a race-neutral admission process would bring
about the admission of a substantial number of minority applicants at
the "non-elite" law schools, since the minority students now admitted
to the "elite" law schools under racial preference would have the same
credential level as the white students seeking admission to the "nonelite" law schools. Under this view, racial preference results in
7. See generally the discussion of the "equal participation objective" in Sedler,
Racial Preference, supra note 5 at 125-135.
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"mismatching," because minority students are admitted with lower
credential levels than white students, which is true today at both the
"elite" and the "non-elite" law schools. So, if the "elite" law schools
did not use racial preference to admit minority students, there would be,
as Thomas Sowell has put it, a "redistribution of minority students to
settings where they meet the same standards as the other students
around them."' With the "redistribution" of minority students in this
way, the elimination of racial preference in law school admissions
would not have any significant effect on the ongoing efforts to maintain
and increase minority representation in the legal profession. It would
only mean that fewer minority lawyers would come from the "elite" law
schools and more would come from the "non-elite" law schools.
It can be argued, however, that there are advantages for a lawyer
who comes to the profession from the "elite" law schools, and that in
order for the legal profession to be truly diverse, it must include a fair
representation of minorities from "elite" law schools as well as from
"non-elite" law schools. Otherwise, we may have a "two-tier" legal
profession, with white lawyers coming both from both "elite" and "nonelite" law schools and minority lawyers coming mostly from "non-elite"
law schools.
In any event, even if the law schools cannot use racial preference in
admissions, both the "elite" and the "non-elite" law schools can secure
the admission of at least some of the minority students now being
admitted under racial preference by a consideration of factors that

8. See Thomas Sowell, Mismatching minority students with universities ensures
failure, DETROITNEWS, April 21,1996, at 3B. My understanding is that in Hopwood

itwas shown that the credential level of many minority students admitted under racial
preference at the University of Texas was sufficient to secure their admission without
regard to race at the other public law schools in Texas, such as Texas Tech and the

University of Houston.
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purportedly correlate with race, such as economic disadvantage or
geographic residence. I would note in this regard that there are very
good reasons to give preference in admissions to all economically
disadvantaged students. But as a practical matter, "an economically
disadvantaged" preference may bring in fewer minority students, since
many of the minority students applying to law school today do not
come from economically disadvantaged backgrounds. Residence may
be a more useful correlative with race, since the minority population is
concentrated in the central cities of major American metropolitan areas.
My point here is that even if the law schools, "elite" or otherwise,
cannot use racial preference in admissions, they are likely to try to
secure the admission of a reasonable number of minority students by
using factors that correlate with race. This is constitutionally
permissible as long as these "correlative" factors are administered in a
racially neutral manner and result in the preferential admission of white
students as well as minority students. 9
In the final analysis then, whether or not racial preference in law
school admissions is legally permissible may turn out not to be all that
important. What is most important in my view is that this nation
continue its progress toward achieving a diverse legal profession, in
which racial minorities are full and equal participants with whites. This
has been the result of the use of racial preference in law school
admissions for the last 30 years, and I am confident that minority
students will continue to attend law school in substantial numbers, with
or without racial preference in law school admissions. So long as this
is so, the public interest in a diverse legal profession will continue to be
advanced.

9. See generally Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 945-6.
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